SUURJ: Seattle University Undergraduate Research Journal
Volume 5

Article 20

2021

The Manifestation of Total War in the Mexican Revolution.
Craig Verniest
Seattle University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.seattleu.edu/suurj

Recommended Citation
Verniest, Craig (2021) "The Manifestation of Total War in the Mexican Revolution.," SUURJ: Seattle
University Undergraduate Research Journal: Vol. 5 , Article 20.
Available at: https://scholarworks.seattleu.edu/suurj/vol5/iss1/20

This Full-Length Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Seattle University Journals at
ScholarWorks @ SeattleU. It has been accepted for inclusion in SUURJ: Seattle University Undergraduate Research
Journal by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks @ SeattleU.

The Manifestation of Total War in the
Mexican Revolution
Craig Verniest, History and Spanish
Faculty Mentor: Tom Taylor, PhD, History
Faculty Content Editor: Nova Robinson, PhD,
International Studies and History
Student Editor: Emma Hyman, English

180

Abstract
This manuscript examines the manifestation of total war in the Mexican Revolution and
analyzes why such an extreme form of warfare occurred. “Total war” refers to a mass armed
conflict that is unrestricted in the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, and
the objectives pursued, as well as involving the complete mobilization of civilian and military
resources for the war effort. In the Mexican Revolution, this was expressed in three main
aspects: the implementation of excessive force by and against combatants, the perpetration
of extreme violence, whether intentionally or unintentionally, against non-combatants, and
the appropriation of civilian resources, which damaged civilian livelihood and threatened
resource supplies. The essay cites specific examples of these aspects of total war, including the
use of chemical warfare, the deliberate murder of civilians by combatants, and the pillaging
of civilian property. In analyzing various incidents of the Mexican Revolution, the author
determines that there are several reasons for the manifestation of total war. These include the
use of heavy weaponry, brutal military tactics, the extended duration of the revolution, and the
ideological differences between revolutionary factions.
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Introduction
La Decena Trágica, or the “Ten Tragic Days,” was a period of extreme violence and
wanton destruction that occurred in México City between 9 February and 19 February 1913.
This event occurred in the midst of the broader seven-year armed conflict of the Mexican
Revolution, specifically during the military coup instigated by counterrevolutionary forces
intending to overthrow the reformist-minded government of Francisco I. Madero, leader of the
populist revolt in 1910, and then elected president in 1911. As described by a New York Times
article from 12 February 1913, which covered the third day of violence, “Fleeing citizens cut
down. For hours big guns and rapid fires sweep streets of the capital. Witness of the fighting
says bodies cover streets where fighting occurred. Shells wreck big buildings […] The food
supply in the capital is low. There is no milk or bread to be obtained, owing to the military
activity in the city and the outskirts” (“Madero Spurns Offer” 1).
The events depicted in this article provide perfect examples of “total war” in the
Mexican Revolution, a conflict not hitherto described in terms of total war proportions. “Total
war” refers to a mass armed conflict that is “unrestricted in the weapons used, the territory
or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued” (“Total War,” Oxford References) as well
as involving the “complete mobilization of civilian and military resources and manpower
[sic] for the war effort” (“Total War,” Encyclopedia Britannica). I describe the manifestation of
total war in the Mexican Revolution through three main aspects: the utilization of extreme
and unnecessary violence by and against combatants; the perpetration of violence—whether
intentional or unintentional—against non-combatants; and the involvement or appropriation
of the civilian resource supply for the war effort and the resulting toll it took on resources and
civilians.
This analysis will show that the Mexican Revolution should be conceptualized
of in terms of its use of total war practices, and therefore provoke larger debates on the
historiography of total war and its relation to revolutionary conflicts. World War I has
traditionally been conceived of as the first mass armed conflict(s) to constitute total war,
largely due to the mobilization of multiple global civilian economies and means of production
for the war effort; the extremely high number of casualties inflicted upon both military forces
and civilian non-combatants; the use of weapons and strategies intended to exact as much
damage as possible upon the opposing force; and the worldwide scale of the conflict of
World War I. However, while the Mexican Revolution was not an armed conflict on the scale
of World War I, I argue that it constitutes an early conflict of total war proportions. It shares
similar elements of warfare with that war: especially the level of violence enacted on both
combatants and non-combatants (between one and two million deaths have been attributed to
the direct and indirect damage of the Mexican Revolution), and the appropriation of civilian
resources by belligerent forces. I was prompted to ask why the historiography of World War
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I has traditionally emphasized the implementation of total war, while that of the Mexican
Revolution rarely, if ever, has done so. While this comparison exceeds the constraints of this
paper, I hope to establish future opportunities of this kind.

Background
The Hague Convention
The international Hague Convention of 1907 meant to define “the laws and customs
of war on land” and bind all signatory nations to adhere to its code of conduct (Hague;
ch. 4, art. 1). The Hague Convention of 1907 revised the earlier 1899 First Hague Peace
Conference, which itself had been used to amend the laws and customs of war established
by the Conference of Brussels in 1874 (International Committee of the Red Cross). Given that the

Mexican Revolution began only three years after the Convention was signed, it became one of
the first conflicts in which articles were applied; but the war also exemplifies challenges to the
Convention its rules on just warfare. As will be seen, The Hague Convention articles did very
little to prevent unjust actions as intended.
Articles One and Two of the Convention define which persons could be considered
combatants, stating that if either militia or volunteer corps constituted forces of an army, then
they were defined as combatants (Hague; ch. 4, art. 1). Additionally, if inhabitants of a territory
armed themselves to protect against an invading force, they were considered belligerents
(Hague; ch. 4, art. 2). Many of the forces in the Mexican Revolution were more or less unofficial
armies, and some were composed mainly of conscripted men with little or no official military
training. However, both cases provided above by The Hague Convention determine these
men to be combatants: either they were considered part of “volunteer” or militia forces and
thereby part of official armies, or if they had joined the conflict to protect their homes and
families, they were considered active combatants. Therefore, both the federal and the various
revolutionary forces in the Mexican Revolution were considered combatants in all cases.
The Hague Convention also defined certain methods of warfare as illegal and unjust,
and defined them as actions of total war. These methods included “treacherously” killing or
wounding opposing combatants; killing or wounding combatants who have surrendered;
using “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”; and the
“destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property” (Hague; ch. 4, art. 23). Although what
constitutes “treacherous wounding” or “unnecessary suffering” was not specifically defined,
there were numerous instances in the Mexican Revolution in which one or more methods of
excessive violence occurred. Articles 25, 28, and 46 state that “attacks and bombardments of
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended are prohibited,” that pillaging
under any circumstance is prohibited, and that family rights, human lives, and private
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property must be respected and are prohibited from confiscation (Hague, ch. 4, art. 25, 28,
46). These articles allude to the forced involvement of civilian life in a conflict; tellingly, they
provide rules that were violated in the Mexican Revolution on multiple occasions.

Antecedents to the Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began on 5 October 1910, with the proclamation of the Plan de
San Luis Potosí by Francisco I. Madero. Madero delivered the call for revolution with the intent
of overthrowing the presidency of Porfirio Díaz, a former general in México’s Federal Army
who had ruled México almost without interruption for 35 years. Díaz, whose presidency and
governmental regime was known as El Porfiriato, ruled México as a dictatorship; he instituted
extensive economic and political policies that served to exploit the labor of the urban working
classes and rural, Indigenous and Mestizo peasantry. These policies benefited México’s

economic elite and Western imperial interests in the manner typical of the neocolonialism that
defined much of Latin American politics and economics at the time. The words of Encarnación
Acosta, a campesino (peasant) from the northern state of Chihuahua who joined the revolution
at the age of 13, embody how Díaz’s policies disaffected working-class Mexicans:
The landlord who oversaw our land would often taunt and debase my father. My father
would only take so much of this abuse and tried to defend himself as a human with
individual rights. The unfair landlord hit my father for being so outspoken. I ran to
defend my father and this cold creature hit me down too. We took our complaint to the
officials under Díaz, who, instead of being sympathetic, took our ranch along with the
newborn harvest. (Kallas 247)
Cases like these, where wealthy landowners and political officials collaborated in the
exploitation and brutalization of campesinos, were commonplace during the Porfirian era.
Díaz was able to rule unopposed for so long largely because of his use of “carrot-and-stick”
measures, negotiating political and economic benefits for political opponents who accepted
bribes, while physically or legally coercing those who would not submit to his rule. In doing
so, he constructed a highly centralized state designed by Díaz’s científico (scientific) advisers,
who advanced political and economic policies that worked to “modernize” México, establish
a middle class, and create a coalition of industry and governmental elites under the banner of
“Porfirismo,” the ideological doctrine of Díaz (Knight 1: 21-22). In addition to heads of industry
and government, military leaders also were party to this coalition and ideology, due to Díaz’s
fame as a general.
Throughout the reign of El Porfiriato, various rebellions surfaced, typically originating
in northern and central-southern states, and from the rural, peasant, and (often) indigenous
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peoples there who held grievances with Díaz’s political and economic order. The northern
states had a longstanding tradition of autonomy, or at least decentralization from government
forces. This, together with histories of Indigenous resistance to Spanish and Mexican conquest
(such as the Yaquis from the state of Sonora), as well as the desert and highland geography
that favored concealment, all combined to foment rebellion (Knight 1: 115-116). In the south,
hacienda-style agriculture and land distribution, which favored the wealthy landowning few
over the poor and often Indigenous campesino masses, was the most significant drive of revolts
against the governing forces (Knight 1: 79;82). In response, local and federal government
officials called on the Federal Army to suppress these rebellions, frequently implementing
brutal measures in doing so. For example, throughout the reign of El Porfiriato, the federal
government engaged in a series of wars with the aforementioned Yaqui peoples, resulting
in numerous recorded massacres of noncombatant Yaqui men, women, and children; this

eventually culminated in the forced deportation of 8,000 – 15,000 Yaquis from their home
territory in Sonora to southern Mexican states between 1902 and 1908 (Schmall).
This history of political and economic oppression, popular revolt, and harsh military
suppression influenced the development of the Mexican Revolution and the emergence of total
war through its duration. In the words of Acosta, “I joined [the revolution] more by impulse,
outrage, and revenge than patriotism […] While fighting the government soldiers I felt I was
fighting against all injustices of all the landowners for their greediness and abuses of the poor”
(Kallas 247; 250). Many of those who fought in the revolution did so to end oppressive rule.
To accomplish this goal, they would often use any means necessary to ensure that the reign
of injustice would end. By this reasoning, one can begin to understand why total war would
come to define the Mexican Revolution.

The First Phase of the Mexican Revolution: Popular Uprising
Madero achieved a popular revolution upon the pronouncement and promulgation of
his Plan de San Luis Potosí in late 1910, primarily gaining his support from serrano (mountaindweller) movements in northern México, like those of Pancho Villa and Pascual Orozco in
Chihuahua, which followed the traditions of past rebellions by focusing on enhancing local
autonomy, advancing agrarian and economic reform, and combatting the centralization of
government propagated under El Porfiriato. Madero gained additional support amongst
agrarista (agrarian reform) movements in the south, like that of Emiliano Zapata, which, while
following previous trends, were focused almost exclusively on land reform and achieving
greater land repatriation for peasants Knight 1: 169). Madero and those who answered his call
succeeded in overthrowing Porfirio Díaz in May 1911, with Madero elected as president of
México in the following November election.
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The Second Phase of the Revolution: Revolutionaries in Power
Although the second full year of revolution in México saw the advancement of free
elections and restoration of constitutional rule that Madero promised in his Plan de San Luis
Potosí, this progress was marred by growing discontent with his lack of substantial economic
and social reform; his inability to commit to either the conservatives or the radicals vying for
his support; and his decision to disband the revolutionary groups that helped him achieve
power, instead relying on the military leaders and Federal Army that had fought against
them during the uprising against Díaz. Thus, numerous rebellions emerged with the intent
of overthrowing Madero and assuming control of the Mexican government. One was led by
Emiliano Zapata, who turned on Madero in order to continue to fight for expanded agrarian
reform. Another was headed by Pascual Orozco, who was discontented with Madero’s failure
to advance radical policies, and felt that he had received insufficient recognition in helping
overthrow Porfirio Díaz. Other, reactionary, revolts were led by various conservative leaders,
such as Bernardo Reyes (a former general in Porfirio Díaz’s army and one-time political ally
of Díaz), and Félix Díaz, Porfirio Díaz’s nephew, who desired a return to the “traditional”
political and economic order that flourished under El Porfiriato (Knight 1: 289-333).

First Aspect of Total War: Loss of Civilian Life
La Decena Trágica and the End of the Revolutionary Government
Widespread civil discontent turned to terrible violence in February 1913 with La Decena
Trágica. Following failed rebellions in both August and October 1912, respectively, both Reyes
and Félix Díaz were aprehended by Federal forces and incarcerated in México City (Knight 1:
481). Due to the continued influence of Porfirismo amongst the military and police command,
Reyes and Díaz planned and instigated a coup from within prison with the assistance of many
of the military forces stationed within the city, primarily those of Generals Manuel Mondragón
and Gregorio Ruiz, career military men who served throughout El Porfiriato (Knight 1: 481).
The coup began on the morning of 9 February, with an attack on the National Palace by a
force of rebel Federal soldiers led by Díaz and Reyes. The attack was ultimately a failure,
resulting in the death of Reyes and the forced retreat of the remaining rebel Federal forces to
La Ciudadela, an old arsenal a mile and a half away from the National Palace (Knight 1: 482).
Over the next ten days, much of the fighting would occur in this area. This first battle and the
subsequent fighting in la Decena Trágica provides instances in which non-combatants were
either intentionally or accidentally targeted by the warring factions, as well as supplementary
examples of both excessive violence perpetrated by combatants and the destruction of civilian
property.
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Articles from three different news outlets, as well as historian Alan Knight’s The
Mexican Revolution, are helpful in analyzing the events of la Decena Trágica. The first periodical
source is the Mexican-based Regeneración, created by “los Hermanos Flores Magón,” three
reporters during the period of El Porfiriato who were well known for their their socialist and
anarchist beliefs, for their opposition to Porfirian politics, and for their resistance to censorship
of the press. The second periodical source is the Mexican-American La Prensa, published in
San Antonio, Texas which shows a more favorable bias towards the reactionary forces in its
coverage of the events. The third periodical is the US-based New York Times, which doesn’t
reveal a clear bias for either side in the conflict (but could potentially hold a more conservative
bias, given the US government’s support for Porfirio Díaz and the economic interests of
American investors and businessmen in México at the time). A New York Times article
published on 10 February 1913 describes the outbreak of fighting in front of the National
Palace on the first day of la Decena Trágica, stating that “[i]n this engagement, more than 300
persons were killed. Most of them were non-combatants. A large crowd had gathered around
the palace, and into the assemblage both sides fired” (“Army Revolts” 1-2). This version of
the events is supported in the article from La Prensa, which reported that, “The assaulting
troops gave several charges over the crowd that witnessed the fight, resulting in various
deaths and injuries […] In the battle that the belligerents sustained in front of the Palace, it is
calculated that there were around 200 deaths” (“El epilogo de la gran tragedia revolucionaria
parece estar muy cercano” 1). Despite the differences in overall death toll, both accounts are
further confirmed in Knight’s analysis: “For some ten minutes the Zócalo became a battlefield:
Reyes was shot dead along with 400 others, many of them civilian bystanders” (1: 483). These
accounts ultimately conclude that both the military rebels under Díaz’s command and the
Federal soldiers under Madero committed violence against a non-combatant populace, a trend
in the warfare that would be repeated in the coming days.
The third day of fighting in la Decena Trágica saw combatants continuing to commit
acts of violence against non-combatants, this time additionally destroying civilian property. A
New York Times article covering the fighting noted that during the attack on La Ciudadela, “[h]
eavy artillery were used on both sides, and the firing was directed without regard to the noncombatants in the streets or to the property of foreigners. The government losses are heavy.
One estimate is over 1,000 killed and wounded [soldiers]. This is probably conservative. The
loss among non-combatants is also heavy” (“Madero Spurns Offer” 1). Articles from both
Regeneración and La Prensa further affirm this form of close-quarters combat within the city
and the destructive effect it had on civilian life. Regeneración states that, “[t]ransformed into
crazy [persons], into brutes, the men of the [Federal] army have divided into two bands and,
spewing thousands of grenades and cannonballs, have left México City in ruins and murdered
thousands of men, women, and children” (“El Gobierno Maderista ha Muerto” 1). Meanwhile,
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La Prensa expresses that “[w]ith the bombardment of La Ciudadela, many private residences
have been destroyed, causing the deaths of countless persons” (“El Epilogo de la Gran
Tragedia Revolucionaria Parece estar Muy Cercano” 1).
These articles could be seen as embellishing their narratives in order to serve either
their own biases or the interests of their leadership. However, Knight’s description confirms
the authenticity of these accounts, noting that “[o]n the morning of 11 February, government
forces opened the attack on La Ciudadela with a massive artillery barrage (to which the rebels
replied in kind) followed by waves of infantry; there were over 500 casualties, including many
civilians” (1: 483). The evidence gleaned from all four accounts indicates that these weren’t
mere accidental killings of a few non-combatant bystanders, but rather that both the Federal
Army and the military rebels under Díaz’s command showed explicit disregard for the safety
of nearby non-combatants, resulting in the deaths of many innocent people. The deaths of

civilians caught in the crossfire provide insight into how the Mexican Revolution would
eventually reach conditions of total war, and foreshadowed much of the escalation in violence
and brutality that would be seen in the following years.
Due to political dealings between Felix Díaz and General Victoriano Huerta (a highranking general during El Porfiriato and a known associate of Reyes who had been appointed
by Madero to lead the Federal defense during La Decena Trágica), as well as continued hostility
from the reactionary elements of the Federal Army, Madero’s aspirational government was
doomed to fail. On 19 February 1913, the 29 Battalion under command of Porfirista General
Blanquet marched into the National Palace and arrested President Madero and Vice President
José María Pino Suárez, ending Madero’s term as president and effectively establishing Huerta
in his place (Knight 1: 487). Three days later, Madero and Pino Suárez were shot and killed
while being transported to the Federal District penitentiary. Although the official report from
Huerta’s government claimed that rebels attempting to liberate the two attacked the convoy
transporting them, and that Madero and Pino Suárez were gunned down while attempting to
escape, it is widely believed that Huerta simply had the two executed for posing future threat
if left alive (“Huerta Promises” 1). Ultimately though, the revolution did not die with Madero’s
murder: in the words of Renato Leduc, a Mexican journalist who worked as a telegraphist
during the revolution, “[Madero’s] death started the real revolution” (Reed ix).
th

The Third Phase of the Revolution: Civil War
The period of the Mexican Revolution lasting from March 1913 to July 1914 involved
a civil war between Huerta’s counterrevolutionary Federal Army and the newly emergent
Constitutionalist Army, led by a coalition of Venustiano Carranza, Francisco “Pancho” Villa,
and Álvaro Obregón. Carranza was the governor of the state of Coahuila, and following the
assassination of Madero, he issued his Plan de Guadalupe in March 1913, which called for the
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deposition of Huerta and the re-establishment of a democratic, constitutionalist government.
Carranza was joined by Villa’s Division of the North and Obregón, a former rancher who
had fought in the rebellions of 1912 and would become arguably the most celebrated military
strategist and general in both the Constitutionalist Army and the Mexican Revolution as a
whole. Most of the fighting between the Constitutionalists and the Federal Army in this period
was concentrated in northern and central México, especially in the states of Chihuahua (Villa’s
home state), Coahuila, Durango, Aguascalientes, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, and Guanajuato.
This period of the Mexican Revolution is typically characterized as one of the bloodiest phases
of the revolution, and for that reason, much of my analysis will be drawn from the events of
this period. Specifically, the battles of Gómez Palacio and Zacatecas provide prime examples
of how the acceleration toward a year-long civil war led to escalations in the methods and
brutality of the combat.

Second Aspect of Total War: Superfluous Violence Between
Combatants
The Battles of Gómez Palacio and Zacatecas
Analysis of the Battle of Gómez Palacio, which occurred 22 –26 March 1914 draws
from first-hand accounts of the battle. At Gómez Palacio, the Federal forces were able to wield
around 10,000 soldiers, while the Constitutionalist forces, commanded by Villa, were likely
able to employ between 7,500 and 10,000 soldiers (Knight 2: 143-145). Throughout Reed’s
account of the battle, two known instances emerge in which Federal forces used poison as
an attempt to wound or kill their opponents. The first is described in a conversation between
Reed and a general:
“You see the water from these ditches comes from the river inside the town, so I thought
it might be a Federal paper.” I took it from his hand. It was a little folded white piece
of wet paper, like the corner and front of a package. In large black letters was printed
on the front, “ARSENICO,” and in smaller type, “Cuidado! Veneno!” “Arsenic. Beware!
Poison!” […] “A good many of the men have had bad cramps in the stomach, and I
don’t feel altogether well. Just before you came a mule suddenly keeled over and died
in that next field, and a horse across the ditch”[…] I explained to him that the Federals
had poisoned the ditch. (Reed 234)
Later, Reed notes that “[o]n the very edge of this road, under a bush, was an earthen jar full
of milk. ‘Poisoned,’ [a Constitutionalist soldier] said briefly. ‘The first company stationed over
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here drank some of that stuff. Four died’”(Reed 238). Article 23 of The Hague Convention
expressly states that the employment of poison or poisoned weapons is forbidden, and given
that the Federal soldiers, being representatives of the federal government and being thereby
bound to its signing of the Convention, committed poisoning, this case represents a clear
violation of the Hague Convention and its prohibition of certain types of weapons and agents
of warfare (Hague; ch. 4, art. 23). Given that at least four men were killed and many more
wounded due to the use of this poison, the intent to grievously wound or kill the opposing
belligerents is treated as though it were an acceptable aspect of warfare. Furthermore, given
that the soldier in the account states that the water they found poisoned originated from a
river inside the town, it can be surmised that a significant portion of the river was poisoned;
this suggests the very possible danger of non-combatants consuming the water and suffering
harmful effects or even death from its contamination.

The Battle of Gómez Palacio culminated in prolonged attacks for the final two days of
the battle on principal locations in the town of Gómez Palacio, known variously as the Lerdo,
the Cerro, the Corral, and the cuartel. Reed describes a scene in which Constitutionalist forces
advancing on the town were fired on with heavy artillery:
They were opening upon the little line of climbing men with artillery! The ring of flame
was broken now in many places, but it never faltered. Then all at once it seemed to
wither completely, and little single fireflies kept dropping down the slope—all that
were left […] That night they attacked the Cerro seven times on foot, and at every attack
seven-eighths of them were killed.” (252)
This condition of warfare violates two of the components of Article 23 of The Hague
Convention: the prohibition of murder and treacherous wounding of belligerent forces and the
employment of arms, projectiles, or materials intended to cause unnecessary suffering (Hague;
ch.4, art. 23). The effective use of artillery by the Federal forces against unshielded combatants
represents employment of arms intended to cause superfluous injury and suffering. The added
weight of each attacking force suffering the deaths of almost 90% of their men evidences the
Federal forces’ flagrant attempt to massacre the Constitutionalist opposition. All in all, the
Constitutionalists were able to emerge victorious at the Battle of Gomez Palacio, but suffered
casualties in the figures of 1,000 men killed and around 2,000 men wounded; this further
exemplifies the high stakes and brutality of this phase of the revolution (Reed 254).
The death blow to the Federal army and the end of this phase of the Mexican
Revolution came on 23 June 1914, with the bloodiest battle yet: The Battle of Zacatecas. The
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battle, which began on 17 June and ended on 23 June, involved over 20,000 Constitutionalist
soldiers from Villa’s Division of the North and 12,000 Federal soldiers. As Knight describes it,
at Zacatecas the rebels stoppered every outlet and subjected the fleeing Federals to
withering enfilade fire. The defeat became a rout and the rout became a massacre.
Maybe 6,000 Federals died: some killed when the public buildings and arsenal were
dynamited; some—the officers—who could not escape summary execution […] All told,
only a few hundred of the Federal garrison of 12,000 reached Aguascalientes; of the rest,
maybe half were killed and half taken prisoner. (2: 168-169)
Knight’s description of the Battle of Zacatecas provides several examples of how extreme and
unnecessary violence inhered in this phase of the Mexican Revolution. The Constitutionalists’

attempt to stop all Federals from escaping and instead to murder them shows that they did not
abide by the rule to solely incapacitate the enemy; rather, they attempted to exterminate the
Federal army entirely. The casualty statistics for the Federals further support this, as at least
6,000 Federal soldiers were killed in combat, and a further 3,000 were wounded, representing
casualties of at least three quarters of the Federal forces stationed at Zacatecas (Knight 2: 168).
Furthermore, the execution of captured Federal officers provides an example of how
Constitutionalists violated The Hague Convention’s mandate prohibiting the mistreatment
of prisoners. Instances exist throughout the revolution where armies, regardless of faction,
mistreated and executed prisoners. During the attack on the National Palace in La Decena
Trágica, fifteen military cadets and General Ruiz were captured and summarily executed by
Huerta (Knight 1: 483). Though captured foot soldiers were executed during the first phase of
popular revolt, the execution of a high-ranking officer like General Ruiz marked an escalation
in the brutality of the treatment of prisoners. This escalation would be seen in the following
period of civil war, especially amongst Villa’s Division of the North, who were well-known for
murdering captured Federal officers in every battle fought against them (Reed 143). The case
of Zacatecas, therefore, reflects the rule rather than the exception, and shows how a brand of
unjust warfare that emphasized massacring one’s enemies and violating the rules of war had
become the norm by the end of the first civil war.

The Fourth Phase of the Revolution: A Second Period of Civil War
The Battle of Zacatecas led to the resignation of Huerta as president on 15 July 1914,
the arrival of Carranza’s and Obregón’s Constitutionalist forces in México City in early
August (Villa’s Division of the North had retired to Chihuahua to protect its home territory),
and the signing of the Treaty of Teoloyucán on 13 August, which required the dissolution
of the Federal army and transferred the position of national government to the hands of
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the Constitutionalists (Knight 2: 169-171). The Convention of Aguascalientes was called to
reintroduce constitutional government, involving delegations from Carranza, Obregón, Villa,
and Zapata, but quickly broke down due to politicking and differing plans for social and
economic reform between the alliances of Carranza and Obregón, and Villa and Zapata. Civil
war broke out for a second time in the Mexican Revolution, this time between Zapata’s and
Villa’s Conventionalists and Carranza’s and Obregón’s Constitutionalists. This phase of civil
war lasted from 1915 to 1917, and is characterized as one of the most brutal phases, largely
due to the style of the warfare developed between the Constitutionalists and Huerta’s regime.
By the end of 1916, the Constitutionalists would emerge as the new regime in power, having
defeated the Conventionalists, forced Villa and Zapata to convert their forces into smaller
guerrilla bands, and ended the period of mass armed conflict.

Third Aspect of Total War: Exploitation of Civilian Resources
The third and final aspect of total war in the Mexican Revolution is the often-coerced
involvement of the civilian sphere by different military forces, especially in relation to
resources, supplies, and labor force. One of the first large-scale instances in which civilian
resources were adversely affected by the fighting in the revolution occurred during the events
of La Decena Trágica. The article from La Prensa covering the events of the third day observed
that, after the artillery barrage on La Ciudadela, “[t]he city is found without lighting and a
panicked terror overcomes the inhabitants. The electric streetcars don’t circulate, and only the
ambulances working to collect the dead and injured pass through the streets” (“El epilogo de
la gran tragedia revolucionaria parece estar muy cercano” 1). Instances like these are further
corroborated by the New York Times article from the third day, which noted severe food supply
shortages throughout the capital, and Knight’s account which stated that “[s]hells were lobbed
across the city centre, machine-gun fire raked chic residential and commercial streets. The
lamp-posts leaned, and festoons of telegraph wire draped themselves across deserted plazas.
Rubble and corpses strewed the streets, and between them dodged ‘Buen Tono’ vans, acting as
makeshift ambulances […] Fresh food became scarce, prices shot up, and some people—it was
later said—dined on dog and cat” (1: 484). The failure of the city’s electricity, the dwindling
food supply, and the loss of other civil services reveal how the strain on civilian resources
became a central theme during la Decena Trágica, a theme which would be repeated and
amplified as time went on and the revolution intensified.
A case from My Village During the Revolution describes specific instances in which the
factioned armies came into villages and expropriated food supplies: “[t]he Constitutionalists
arrived with their almost yellow uniforms, in search of wheat, and they unfortunately found it,
put it in sacks, then took it away […] Then came the crude, hated Zapatistas in search of corn,
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and they unfortunately found it, then carried it away” (Batalla 96). From the beginning of the
revolution, it was common practice for armies to seek sustenance as well as lodging from the
people whose territory they occupied. This style of accommodation might be coerced through
the threat of violence, or might be requested but inadequately compensated with currencies
whose use and value depended on the time, place, and person. The appropriation of housing
and food supplies occurred throughout the entire period of armed conflict, for various reasons:
as a way for an army to impose power and control over those they occupied; as the cost of the
army’s “protection” of the people against other armed forces; and as the standard material
consumption exacted by a large body of transient soldiers. Ultimately, whether Federal or
independent, revolutionary or reactionary, all factions of the revolution engaged in the practice
of confiscating or inadequately paying for the resources of the regions they occupied.
In addition to food and lodging, transportation, communication, and real estate were
also appropriated by Federal and revolutionary forces. By the civil war of 1913-1914, it had
become common practice for retreating armies to destroy or impair railroads, telegraph lines,
and other methods of transportation. These actions further damaged the ability of the vast
majority of the Mexican population to utilize these essential resources, and given the lack of
consistent administration and supplies to fix the damages, preventing many citizens from
using such resources for months. Reed describes an instance preceding the Battle of Gómez
Palacio:

After an hour of riding we came to a piece of broken track […] It was an old destruction,
probably a year old, made when these same Constitutionalists were retreating north in
the face of Mercado’s Federal army, and we had it all fixed in an hour. Then on again.
Sometimes it was a bridge burned out, sometimes a hundred yards of track twisted into
grape vines by a chain and a backing engine. (Reed 193)
Cases of intentional destruction like this are noted by Knight and Reed, indicating that
these weren’t isolated instances, but a standard practice of war that became more and more
entrenched as the revolution dragged on.
Examples of more “forceful” forms of expropriation can be seen in the acts of pillaging
towns and the theft of personal property, both of which had been expressly prohibited by
Articles 28 and 46 of The Hague Convention. Such an instance of pillaging and confiscation
of property is exhibited in Edith Henry’s memoir The Death of Frank Henry. The author recalls
the invasion of the town of Zacualpan on the border of the states of Guerrero and Mexico in
1916 by Zapatistas. During the invasion, the Zapatistas ransacked Henry’s house and pillaged
both it and the rest of the town. Henry noted that “[t]hey tore off my wedding ring […] They
demanded money and our weapons, and with the muzzle of a gun at my head I showed where
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the other two guns were, and where my silver teapot and a few other things were hidden”
(Henry 99).
Looting occurred throughout the different phases of revolution: at a time when large
groups of armed individuals challenged government authority, it is clear how cases like large
and small-scale larceny could occur. The pillage of Zacualpan took place in 1916, well into the
second civil war between the Constitutionalists and the Conventionalists: by this time, the
country had been in armed conflict for six years, and civilians were experiencing more acutely
the effects of extended periods of warfare.
Villa’s implementation of conscription into his forces in 1916 was one manifestation of
this escalation. During the first phase of popular revolt and the period of civil war between
Huerta and the Constitutionalists, the revolutionary forces were largely made up of volunteers.
During the civil war between the Conventionalists and the Constitutionalists, particularly in
the latter days of Villa’s continued insurgency following his defeat at Celaya, troops began to
be amassed forcibly. The account of Jesús Avila from Aquellos Años de la Revolución describes his
forced service: “Villa issued a decree in the State of Chihuahua [in 1916]. Every male member
of a family was to serve in his troops. I was barely fifteen years old” (qtd. in Kallas 265-266).
Additionally, Maria Villasaña Lopez was abducted from her home at the age of 14 in 1916 by
Villista forces, and her account demonstrates how conscription was experienced by a young
woman during the revolution:
Before they left the area, General Bonilla kidnapped me and another officer took my
younger sister from our home. My mother wept and pleaded for them to leave us with
her, but not our tears, our panic, or our screams helped at all. I was given a rifle just like
the other women […] I did help in washing the wounds of the soldiers and in caring
for the sick. Many times we were half naked from making bandages with our clothes.
(Kallas 367)
Both Avila’s and López’s accounts makes it apparent that conscription became a hated
condition of the warfare in the Mexican Revolution as it dragged on and as it drained
resources, even in terms of human lives and labor.
All in all, the appropriation of civilian resources by the different armies of the
revolution occurred in a variety of ways. Certain aspects were present throughout the conflict,
while others developed as the tactics used by revolutionaries to achieve order in government
became harsher. However, one constant was the effect that this exploitation had on civilians
themselves. Although life under El Porfiriatio certainly negatively impacted a large percentage
of the Mexican population, the years of protracted warfare, increased consumption of
resources, and the fear produced by living under constant threat of occupation during the
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Mexican Revolution had an increasingly debilitating effect on México’s people. By the end of
the period of mass armed conflict in 1917, a significant portion of the hundreds of thousands of
deaths seen in the revolution could likely be attributed to the increased material, physical, and
psychological strain on civilians and civilian resources caused by the developments in war.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the Mexican Revolution exemplifies the concept of total war manifested
on multiple levels. Through the examination of the degree of violence used by combatants, the
failure to protect non-combatants from harm, and the complete absorption of civilian resources
and other areas of life, it becomes apparent that this was an armed conflict unrestricted in its
methods of war. Furthermore, as the revolution dragged on, the various factions involved
became more and more willing to engage in practices of total war.
There are various reasons as to why the revolution escalated to a conflict of total
war proportions, including, as I have demonstrated, the greater implementation of heavier
weaponry, more brutal military tactics, and the extended duration of the revolution. However,
examining various sources reveals that one of the biggest factors in producing total war in
the Revolution was ideological difference: those existing both between revolutionaries and
the counterrevolutionary ideology of the federal governments, and between the various
revolutionary forces themselves. Once the call for popular rebellion was put forth in 1910,
many of the revolutionary forces that answered it did so with the shared belief in their need
to overthrow El Porfiriato, return the nation to a state of democracy, and end the exploitation
of México’s campesinos and working-class peoples. The first two goals were achieved
within the first year of the revolution, but the goal of extensive social and economic reform
slipped out of reach once the country saw the return to the Porfirismo-style of government
following Huerta’s overthrow of Madero. Thus, upon entering into civil war with Huerta, the
revolutionaries committed themselves to deposing his regime by any means necessary, so as
to cancel Madero’s mistakes that prevented reform at the national level. On the other side,
Huerta viewed the revolutionaries’ movement for social and political change as being wholly
unfounded, he himself desiring a return to the Porfirismo that he believed to be the correct
governance and social order for the country. To bring this about, he attempted to crush the
revolutionary movement as swiftly and absolutely as possible in order to return civil order to
the country. Both parties therefore escalated their methods and measures of warfare to that of
total war proportions.
The later civil war between the Constitutionalists and the Conventionalists followed
similar lines. The Convention of Aguascalientes in 1914 attempted to unify the various
political, social, and economic desires proposed by the numerous revolutionary forces that
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composed the Constitutionalists and their allies. The failure of the convention exposed
the irreconcilable differences within the revolutionary movement, and prompted a return
to warfare that would essentially rehash the conflict played out between Huerta and the
Constitutionalists for control of the country (Knight 2: 261-264). Exacerbated further by
the increasing popular sense that the revolution was turning into a perpetual war, the
revolutionaries reengaged in methods invoking total war in an attempt to seize power as
quickly as possible. The escalation in warfare between Villa’s Conventionalists and Obregon’s
Constitutionalists, as well as the rapid revision of the constitution in 1917, demonstrates the
Constitutionalists’ desire to expedite their version of governmental order and stability (Knight
2: 470). Therefore, ideological differences between the various sides of the revolution largely
motivated their engagement in total war methods, with the view that doing so would allow
them to prevent the triumph of the opposition’s control of Mexican affairs. That being said,

other factors certainly contributed to the development of total war, which is a subject that
should be further explored in the future.
This essay demonstrates the need for more research devoted to the Mexican Revolution,
its military history, and how this conflict affected and was experienced by those who lived
through it. Furthermore, greater consideration should be given to the Mexican Revolution and
its place in the historiography of the concept of total war. The case of the Mexican Revolution
provides an example in which, through contemporary definitions of total warfare, we are able
to examine a revolution through the lens of a concept typically only associated with Western
wars. Therefore, this concept’s scope could be widened to describe other global revolutions or
mass armed conflicts, both in the past, and in more contemporary contexts.

Works Cited
“Army Revolts, Seizes México City; Madero’s Troops Hold the Palace; 300 Are Slain in the First
Clash.” New York Times, 10 February 1913, pp. 1-2. New York Times https://timesmachine.nytimes.
com/timesmachine/1913/02/10/issue.html.
Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo. “My Village during the Revolution.” The Mexican Revolution: A Brief
History with Documents, edited by Mark Wasserman, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012, pp. 94-96.
“El Gobierno Maderista ha Muerto.” Regeneración, 22 February, 1913, pp. 1. Archivo Magon,
http://archivomagon.net/wp-content/uploads/e4n129.pdf.  
“El Epilogo de la Gran Tragedia Revolucionaria Parece estar Muy Cercano.” La Prensa, 13
February, 1913, pp. 1. Library of Congress: Chronicling America, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/
lccn/sn83045395/1913-02-13/ed-1/seq-1/.

196

Henry, Edith. “The Death of Frank Henry.” The Mexican Revolution: A Brief History with
Documents, edited by Mark Wasserman, Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2012, pp. 97-100.
“Huerta Promises to Satisfy Society on Killings.” New York Times. 24 February 1913, pp. 1. New
York Times TimesMachine, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1913/02/24/issue.html.
“Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.” International
Committee of the Red Cross. 18 October 1910, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195.
Kallas, James, et al. Aquellos Años de la Revolución Mexicana 1910 – 1920 [Those Years of the
Revolution, 1910 – 1920]. San José, California: Aztlan Today Pub. Co., 1974.
Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1: Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986.
---. The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 2: Counter-revolution and Reconstruction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
“Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV).” 1907. Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/
law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0631.pdf.
“Madero Spurns Offer of Mediation and Opens Attack on Foe.” New York Times, 12
February 1913, pp. 1. New York Times TimesMachine, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1913/02/12/100388297.html?pageNumber=1.
Reed, John. Insurgent Mexico. International Publishers Co., Inc., 1969.
Schmall, John P. “Watching the Yaquis from Los Angeles (1894-1937): Enduring Resistance
in the Face of Extermination.” Indigenous México. Last modified September 12, 2019. https://
indigenousmexico.org/sonora/watching-the-yaquis-from-los-angeles-1894-1937-enduring-resistance-inthe-face-of-extermination/.
“Total war.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/total-war
“Total war.” Oxford Reference. https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/
acref/9780199891580.001.0001/acref-9780199891580-e-8377.

197

